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The Philippines is no stranger to geopolitics. It stood near the frontier of ideological struggles as the Cold War raged in the Asia-Pacific. Not only did American bases in the Philippines 
figure in the Korea and Vietnam conflicts, but the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea 
(PEFTOK) also fought on behalf of the United States against North Korean and Chinese forces. 
In the post-Cold War era, however, the Philippines finds itself in a changed world. In 1991, the 
United States left Clark Air Force Base and Subic Naval Base as the communist threat to the 
region receded. Few probably suspected then that the Philippines would have to reckon with 
another rising, ostensibly communist power, in a few years’ time. 
Alike practically all other countries and regions, the Philippines has had to consider the relative rise 
of China amidst American decline. However, its foreign policy interests are contextually shaped by 
its American colonial legacy and enduring ties with the United States on one hand, and its historical 
influences from and geographical proximity to China on the other. Another layer of complexity is added 
by the Philippines being part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which fellow 
member nations have their own ideas about their collective role in responding to Sino-American tussles 
over regional hegemony. 
This contribution will review the sociohistorical, military and economic factors that shape Philippine foreign 
policy towards China and the United States. When these factors are considered, it remains evident that 
the United States retains an advantage over China in having closer relations with the Philippines. That 
said, the United States would be mistaken to think that it has implicit backing whenever the Philippines 
must choose between rewarding Chinese or American interests. That said, the Chinese may yet discover 
that influence over the Philippines’ external relations also has its price. Sociohistorical, military and 
economic advantages that either China or the United States holds in its dealings with the Philippines are 
not fungible or readily transferrable into advantages in other realms, since cultural, military and economic 
actors differ, while Philippine public opinion tends to fixate on current events.
SOCIOHISTORICAL ASPECTS
If the contest between China and the US for Filipino affections solely concerned cultural affinity, then the 
United States would have a convincing advantage. Despite its American period of colonisation being far 
shorter than its Spanish one, the Philippines’ ties with the United States are deeper and more extensive. 
While Chinese interactions with residents of the Philippine islands date back to a far earlier time, China 
itself has largely been unable to translate sociohistorical linkages into ‘soft power’ that it can leverage.
As Michael Cox argues elsewhere in this report, part of the United States’ lasting appeal lies in foreigners 
being able to see themselves as emigrants living some variant of the American Dream. Nowhere is this 
intuition more evident than with Filipinos, who have been among its most avid consumers. Despite the 
Philippines’ population being less than a tenth of China’s, Filipino-Americans lag behind only Chinese- 
Americans as the second largest Asian minority in the United States. With Philippine education and medical 
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systems modelled on those of the US, Filipinos fluent in 
English have readily assimilated into American society, 
reaching native standards of living when windows of 
opportunity have opened.
Filipino entertainment is also heavily influenced by 
Filipino successes breaking into the mainstream of 
American pop culture. Arnel Pineda from Olongapo 
City near Subic Bay became an overnight sensation 
when Neal Schon of the San Francisco-based band 
Journey made Pineda their new lead singer after 
watching him perform on YouTube. Similarly, Charice 
Pempengco gained global fame by appearing on the 
hit TV show Glee playing an exchange student. Boxer-
turned-congressman Manny Pacquiao has earned 
most of his fame in Las Vegas bouts, even boasting 
that he helped Democratic Senator Harry Reid win re-
election in 2008 by asking Filipino-American Nevadans 
to vote for Reid. Hence, a colonial mentality remains 
evident in how Filipinos view ‘making it big’ as doing 
well in America.
Vocal but minority voices aside, it comes as no surprise 
that Filipinos generally regard their former colonisers 
warmly. Opinion poll after opinion poll verifies this 
assertion. Even after the Bush administration sullied 
world opinion of the United States, the Philippines 
still regarded it favourably. In a BBC World Service 
poll conducted after George W. Bush’s re-election in 
2004, 63% of Filipinos viewed his victory as conducive 
for world peace and security – the most in a sample 
of eighteen nations. Pertinently for this discussion, 
Philippine opinions of China are not as favourable 
and routinely rank well below those expressed for 
the United States.
To be sure, the Philippines is heavily influenced by 
Chinese culture and history. Historians believe that 
Chinese traders have plied their wares in the Philippine 
islands since the ninth century, with many subsequently 
settling there. Further, it has been led by persons of 
mixed Chinese ancestry in current President Benigno 
Aquino III as well as his mother, Corazon Aquino. 
The Philippine’s national hero, the novelist Jose Rizal, 
was likewise a Chinese mestizo. As elsewhere in the 
region, Filipino business elites are predominantly of 
Chinese heritage. Chinese New Year is even a national 
holiday in the Philippines. 
Yet, from a foreign policy standpoint, it is remarkable 
that China has been unable to translate these historical 
influences into something more substantial. Opinion 
polls reflect guardedness among Filipinos who are 
more likely to distrust than trust China, especially 
after 2012’s run-ins at the disputed Scarborough Shoal 
which began when a Philippine navy vessel stopped 
Chinese fishing boats for allegedly taking endangered 
marine species illegally. In other words, the whole 
of these influences in winning over Filipino hearts 
and minds remains less than the sum of their parts. 
NET trust = percent ‘Much trust’  
minus ‘Little trust’ correctly 
rounded. ‘Don’t Know’ 
and ‘Refused’ responses 
are not shown.
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Figure 1: Net Trust in Selected Countries
SECURITY ASPECTS 
An enduring stumbling block to closer Filipino-Chinese 
relations remains dominion over contested areas 
in the South China Sea lying near the Philippines. 
Although these areas are within the Philippines’ 200 
nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and are 
outside China’s, the latter makes historical claims for 
dominion over them. Illustrating the contentiousness 
of this dispute, as a result of the recent incidences 
near the Scarborough Shoal, which began in April 
of 2012, President Aquino issued an administrative 
order renaming the maritime areas of the disputed 
Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands the ‘West 
Philippine Sea.’ Although estimates of their recoverable 
energy resources vary, few doubt their potential as 
well as their strategic importance for shipping and 
fishing. It is with regard to the South China Sea that 
China’s charm offensive aimed at its Southeast Asian 
neighbours falls short.
China’s military resources outstrip not just those of 
its Southeast Asian neighbours contesting islands in 
the South China Sea, but all of them put together. 
Naturally, China’s diplomatic overtures have had to 
address Southeast Asian nations’ concerns that the 
PRC may use its overwhelming military advantage to 
secure these waters. 
Earlier this century, China made noteworthy 
conciliations that promised progress towards a durable 
resolution to the South China Sea dispute. In 2002, it 
signed on to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea (DOC), a ‘21st century-oriented 
partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust.’ 
The following year, China became the first country 
outside the region to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC). Subsequently, however, China has 
not been able to build on earlier goodwill. Very limited 
progress has been made: ASEAN members attribute 
this to Chinese unwillingness to make the DOC a 
binding resolution. China could instead agree to take 
the matter to the International Court of Justice which 
adjudicates territorial disputes, or the International 
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, which handles those 
over the interpretation of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and which all concerned 
have ratified.
Countries in the region believe that China’s 
unwillingness to ‘multilateralise’ this dispute despite 
the DOC making references to international law in 
general - and UNCLOS in particular - stems from 
China’s desire to maintain power asymmetries by 
dealing with ASEAN members individually instead 
of collectively. On their own, ASEAN parties to this 
territorial dispute like the Philippines and Vietnam 
have limited capabilities in terms of military might or 
diplomatic clout. Whether this truly is China’s intention 
or not, this ‘divide and conquer’ perception certainly 
does not help the tenor of Filipino-Chinese relations. 
Conversely, a country which is not a signatory to 
UNCLOS – the United States – has been able to take 
advantage of Filipino-Chinese differences over the 
South China Sea, less through providing material 
assistance, but more by means of implicit guarantees. 
In 2010 when South China Sea claimant Vietnam 
held the rotating ASEAN chairmanship, it raised the 
matter at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting. 
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stoked the flames 
of the dispute when she stated that the United States 
had a ‘national interest’ in keeping the region’s sea 
lanes open for trade. Although China denounced 
this action as intervention in a matter the US was not 
privy to, the US’s declared stake in the South China 
Sea dispute vividly depicted its effort to reengage in 
the Asia-Pacific region. 
That reengagement, following what Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Kurt Campbell called ‘a middle east detour’ in the 
decade following 9/11, builds on historic security 
arrangements. Although the US left its Philippine 
bases in 1991, the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951 still 
stands. Moreover, the US navy has participated with 
various Southeast Asian navies including that of the 
Philippines in annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness 
and Training (CARAT) exercises as well as the US-
Philippine Balikatan (shoulder to shoulder) exercises. 
Pointedly, Balikatan exercises were held this year in 
Palawan near the Philippines’ disputed claims with 
China. Prior to the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’, 
the Philippines’ longstanding difficulties with Muslim 
extremists and its measured pace of development 
compared to regional peers, meant it was receptive 
to assistance through participation in the global war 
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on terror. However, the South China Sea imbroglio 
has presented the US with a ‘hegemony on the cheap’ 
option as Southeast Asian claimants seek to hedge 
against a noncommittal China. 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
Economically, the Philippines finds itself caught 
between China and the US as they compete for its 
affections. Unlike in the sociohistorical and security 
realms, neither holds a clear advantage. China has 
been better able to portray itself as sharing common 
ground with the Philippines. Once more, this situation 
illustrates the non-fungible nature of differing 
geopolitical resources.
Even now, the United States remains the Philippines’ 
largest trading partner. Generally speaking, this 
relationship has been friendly, with a few minor 
exceptions such as a recent WTO case the US 
successfully brought against the Philippines over 
discrimination against imported liquor. US economic 
influence in the Philippines is extended via the presence 
in Manila of Washington-based lender the World Bank, 
as well as the Asian Development Bank, whose largest 
shareholder alongside Japan is the United States.
Merchandise trade aside, Philippine service exports 
also benefit from American consumers, with the 
country’s move to a post-industrial economy heavily 
conditioned by the US market. Unbeknownst to many, 
the Philippines surpassed India as the world’s call centre 
capital in terms of both employees and revenues in 
2010. While higher value-added business process 
outsourcing (BPO) services remain in India, routine 
tasks such as customer service are now handled by 
Philippine-based outfits. This growth can be attributed 
to an innate hospitality coupled with a grasp of English 
– taught from primary school level onwards – and 
Filipinos’ familiarity with American culture. In 2010, 
eighty percent of Philippine BPO exports went to the 
United States.
Nonetheless, questions remain about Philippine 
reliance on the United States as an export market. 
Not only has the US experienced an economic 
crisis that has forced its consumers to retrench, but 
American incomes have stagnated since the turn of 
the new millennium. Despite the US market being by 
far the world’s largest and the Philippines’ advantages 
exploiting it, diversification remains welcome to 
cushion the local economy from shocks emanating 
from America.
China presents an interesting economic counterweight. 
Collectively, ASEAN is China’s third largest trading 
partner after the EU and the US, surpassing Japan in 
2011. Conversely, China is ASEAN’s largest trading 
partner. Alike with its fellow ASEAN members, China 
has amassed a fair amount of goodwill with the 
Philippines in the economic realm. Here, China is 
better able to portray itself positively as a benign 
force interested in South-South cooperation for 
development, despite the competition China presents 
for a number of Philippine exports, including a number 
of light industries involving the manufacture of 
garments and textiles. 
A watershed event in China’s economic relations with 
its near neighbours was the Asian financial crisis of 
1997/98. Many crisis-hit nations remain critical of 
how the then-prevalent ‘Washington Consensus’ 
orthodoxy of liberalisation, deregulation and 
privatisation was demanded by the US in exchange 
for IMF emergency funding. Socioeconomic hardships 
attributed to blanket implementation of such policies 
made Southeast Asian nations particularly wary of a 
repeat. To its credit, China then did not devalue its 
currency to remain export-competitive with these 
already-suffering nations. That when confronted with 
its own crisis America did exactly the opposite via 
deliberalisation, reregulation and nationalisation cast 
further doubt on American motives. 
Aside from moving closer to ASEAN by joining the ARF 
and signing the TAC, a further pillar of China’s bid for 
influence has been to set up economic mechanisms 
to prevent a repeat of the Asian financial crisis and 
enmesh China in regional trade. The Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) establishes a 
common pool of emergency funding to deal with 
balance of payments issues. Together with Japan, 
China has the largest commitment to the fund at 
$38.4 billion. Another mechanism is the Asian Bond 
Market Initiative (ABMI) that has seen total regional 
bond market issuances expand from $196 billion in 
1997 to $5.9 trillion in 2012.
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The Asian Financial Crisis was in no small part due to 
relying too much on capital from outside the region, 
when Asia has enormous savings that can be used 
for investment. Hence, the emergence of a wider and 
deeper regional capital market should benefit not only 
the region’s savers but also its entrepreneurs. 
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) 
agreed to in 2002 (and which came into effect in 2010) 
set ASEAN on a course to sign many more similar trade 
deals, including with South Korea, Australia & New 
Zealand, and India. ACFTA established a template for 
other economic suitors of ASEAN in joining ARF and 
signing the TAC before negotiating an FTA, thus linking 
security and economic matters. While economists 
complain about ‘trade diversion’ effects arising from 
multiple FTAs co-existing, the political ramifications 
of such deals may be equal to or even outweigh 
economic considerations.
The United States’ pivot towards the region has 
followed a similar pattern. It only signed the TAC 
with ASEAN in 2009. Prior to that, the United States, 
in contrast to China and ASEAN’s ACFTA, had had next 
to no success in establishing an FTA in the Asia-Pacific. 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has 
been its preferred vehicle for launching such initiatives, 
but its proposed Early Voluntary Sector Liberalisation 
(EVSL) and Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) 
have fallen to deaf ears. Despite its various security 
arrangements with America, the Philippines has 
not necessarily supported US efforts to promote 
an APEC-based FTA.
The same holds true at the present time with the much-
hyped Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) enlargement 
discussions. In a case of ‘if you can’t beat ‘em, join 
‘em,’ the United States is seeking to expand an existing 
FTA whose membership consists of APEC members 
Brunei, China, New Zealand and Singapore. Wary of 
being frozen out of regional trade deals, the United 
States seeks to use TPP to not only safeguard its 
trade preferences (such as strong intellectual property 
provisions), but also to create bandwagon effects 
to blunt Chinese momentum. Already, American 
trade authorities have welcomed the participation 
of Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Peru and Vietnam. 
The lack of Philippine interest in TPP despite it being 
an obvious American vehicle to maintain regional 
influence underlines the former’s independent streak 
in economic diplomacy. 
Along with many other developing members of APEC, 
the Philippines has been noticeably keener on technical 
assistance for capacity building. Signing on to several 
FTAs may be confusing or even detrimental, if the 
country in question does not have the institutional 
capacity to facilitate trade. Although lacking in 
glamour, processes such as improving utilisation rates 
of preferential tariffs, automating customs procedures 
and identifying countries of origin more readily are 
matters requiring attention. Insofar as the US does 
not always recognise that trade facilitation precedes 
and improves gains from trade liberalisation, it has 
had trouble gaining the favour of developing APEC 
members like the Philippines.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the sociohistorical, security and 
economic aspects of the regional contest for Philippine 
affections between the US and China, it is evident that 
no suitor has an outright advantage in all three. As we 
have seen, each suitor has its own set of idiosyncrasies 
when it comes to approaching this Southeast Asian 
nation. While their foreign policies do help shape 
Filipino views of the US and China, these policies 
alone do not solely shape such views.
 On the balance, however, there remains a durable tie 
between the Philippines and the United States that 
China has yet to approach. In recent years, Chinese 
officials have invoked the peaceful voyages of Chinese 
explorer Zheng He  to parts of the Orient and beyond 
in the fifteenth century as a historical example of 
goodwill: despite China’s overwhelming economic 
and military clout then, the admiral did not colonise 
the places he visited, and this example is meant to 
soothe present concerns of developing nations of a 
once more ascendant Middle Kingdom. Yet, as far as 
the Philippines is concerned, the United States has 
been more successful in presenting Uncle Sam as a 
benevolent uncle than China has in casting Zheng 
as a peaceful voyager seeking support from other 
shores. Unresolved territorial disputes over the South 
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China Sea belie this desired image of benevolence 
 – especially for the Philippines, which has been 
attempting to read the tea leaves over PRC policy on 
this matter for quite some time.
That senior Chinese officials hint the South China 
Sea is a ‘core national interest’, implying that it is 
on par with Taiwan and Tibet among PRC territorial 
priorities, inspires particular caution given China’s 
military might compared to that of its neighbours. 
Still, the more jingoistic elements of this claim are 
counterbalanced by a need to elicit the support of 
others in the neighbourhood. It is here where the 
Philippines has attempted to play a better hand by 
using ASEAN as a middle power ‘bully pulpit,’ though 
again China has been more attuned to negotiating 
economic arrangements than security arrangements 
with ASEAN. 
To the surprise of some, then, the US-Philippine 
relationship remains durable even at a time when 
the United States is supposedly losing its foothold in 
any number of countries and regions. Cultural affinity 
and blood ties between both nations run deep. While 
the Philippines now has several economic ties with 
China, public opinion suggests these are more out of 
economic necessity than any real affection. Moreover, 
the Philippine economy complements that of the 
United States more than it does China’s, given linguistic 
differences and that Chinese and Philippine exports 
often find themselves in competition in third markets. 
In simple terms, the Philippines remains a country 
for America to lose and one for China to gain in 
the great game of the Asia-Pacific, where each 
nation’s endorsement matters in the contest for 
regional influence. ■
